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Abstract  
 This study, focusing on understanding the relationship between 
democracy and economic development over the concept of taxation, aims to 
analyze the effects of democratic freedoms on a set of economic variables 
such as economic development, corruption, equity of taxation and informal 
economic activities. From this point of view, first the concept of economic 
development has been defined. Then, we have tried to reveal how the 
relationship between tax and accountability, which restores parliamentary 
democracy in the West, affects the interaction between democracy and 
economic development. Analyses carried out taking into account the 
indicators such as taxation, shadow economy and corruption, showed that 
these variables are closely related with the concept of democracy and 
freedoms achieved by economic development.  It was revealed that 
democratic freedoms were strong in countries with high level of economic 
development, but relatively weak in countries with low level of economic 
development.  
 
Keywords: Development, Democratic Freedoms, Taxation, Shadow 
Economy, Corruption 
 
Introduction 
 Achievement of sustainable economic growth constitutes one of the 
basic objectives of the concept of development, the scope of which has 
extended in the course of time. Achieving economic growth is of high 
importance for increasing the welfare of a society, i.e. providing more 
employment opportunities. One of the assumptions regarding how to achieve 
sustainable growth is that economic actors must make investments that will 
turn into production in the public and private sector. The primary purpose of 
the public sector is to finance the resources of investment with the taxes 
collected. However, if a state is incapable of sustaining an effective taxation 
system, it has to resort to borrowing to finance the investments. Preferring 
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the borrowing option to finance the investments prevents economic growth 
from being sustainable.   
 Private sector is the locomotive of a growth that will ensure 
economic development. However, in order for the private sector to make 
investment spending, it must have confidence in the state and functioning of 
the markets, and must be assured that its capital is protected. However, if the 
state fails to give such confidence, the entrepreneurs in the private sector 
prefer not to make any investment or sustain their activities mostly 
underground. When most of the economic production in a country is run 
underground, state cannot impose direct taxes on the economic assets 
produced. Without the direct taxes failed to be collected on production, state 
has to collect taxes on consumption. Such indirect collection of public 
revenues is one of the primary reasons for unfair distribution of income in a 
society. Therefore, efficiency, capacity and form of taxation are of critical 
importance for ensuring correlation between economic development and 
social development within a country.  
 Ensuring transparency and reliability of the interaction between a 
government and its citizens in an effective market mechanism has been 
achieved through democratic judicial systems by which freedoms are 
protected. The first struggle for democracy in history started as a reaction to 
the arbitrary taxes imposed by the political power. Limiting the taxing power 
of the absolute power and creating the legal order for taxation is the first step 
toward the establishment of a constitutional democratic system (Öncel et al. 
2002:7). The principle of democratic constitutional state provides legal 
assurance to the individuals against the state. Tax laws in the constitutional 
states put the government under obligation not to violate fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Only in such a legal structure, will the state be able to ensure 
efficient and effective functioning of economic actors which are classified 
into two groups, entrepreneurs and households.  
 Seeking to reveal the relationship between the concepts of 
development, democracy and tax equity, this study is based on the assertion 
that greater democratic freedoms and tax equity and less shadow economy 
and corruption in the societies with high level of development is not a 
coincidence. Economic development and tax equity emerges out of the 
interaction of variables such as a management mechanism in which 
transparency and registration of production activities in the economy is 
ensured. Failure of certain economically developed countries in achieving 
social development objectives seems to be caused by the tax inequity and 
their inability of implementing democratic values. Therefore, tax equity 
plays an important role in the relationship between the economic concept of 
development and social concept of democracy. 
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The concept of economic development 
 The concepts of economic development and economic growth are 
sometimes used interchangeably. However, they have completely different 
meanings. In fact, economic growth is an important subcomponent of the 
concept of development. It means the increase in the amount of the goods 
and services produced in a country. Economic development, on the other 
hand, aims to increase the quality of social, cultural and political lives of the 
individuals, as well as achieving economic growth.  
 The term development was defined in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 1991 as “aiming to improve people’s quality of life”, 
which is one of the most comprehensive definitions of the term. The 
objective of improving people’s quality of live includes many different 
variables such as higher income levels, better education opportunities, better 
health and nutrition conditions, less poverty, a cleaner environment, 
providing more equal opportunities, increasing individual freedoms and a 
richer cultural life. In this sense, the concept of development is a 
multidimensional process. Development also involves increasing the 
opportunities provided to the individuals and the society in the economic and 
social field. In this context, freedoms can be defined as the existence of 
various alternatives among which the individuals in a society can choose 
freely depending on their preferences. Sen (1996) indicates that political 
freedom in the form of democratic arrangements helps to safeguard 
economic freedom (especially freedom from extreme starvation) and the 
freedom to survive (against famine mortality). The instrumental roles of 
freedom include various interrelated components such as economic and 
political freedom opportunities, transparency and protective security 
applications. The process of development is crucially affected by these 
interconnections. 
 As specified in the study by Meier and Stiglitz (2000), the concepts 
trying to define underdevelopment only over low level of production were 
gradually replaced with structural analyses. Most of the structural analyses 
have focused on the effective functioning of the institutions. The institutions 
upon which economic activities are built are a set of formal and informal 
arrangements. In other words, the institutions are the rules of the game 
played in the society. The rules and institutions reduce the ambiguity of 
economic actors in the decision-making process. Corruption, bureaucracy, 
financial system, judicial system and property rights can be classified under 
the important variables involved in determining the corporate quality. An 
effective and fast judicial system, together with protection of property rights, 
is important in reducing the ambiguity faced by the economic actors. Many 
structural analyses focus on the effective functioning of institutions. 
Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) indicate that the difference between the 
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institutions in a country is the main reason for the differences in the levels of 
development between countries.  
 
Economic Development And Democratic Freedom  
 When we examine the academic studies addressing the relationship 
between economic development and democracy, we can see that there are 
two different viewpoints. One of these viewpoints has been reflected in the 
studies by Ghali (2003) and Bardhan (2004) who suggest liberal democracy 
as a prerequisite for economic development. They argue that democracy 
must be approved as a prerequisite for economic development, since libertian 
values establish the institutional framework and process that guarantees 
property rights, i.e. the basic institution of economic improvement. The 
concepts such as freedom of expression and association, multipartyism and 
elections, the protection of human rights and separation of powers all 
become internalized within liberal democracy. Doğan (2005) also points out 
that democracies affect economic development positively, since they bring 
steady growth as well as investment and consumption opportunities in the 
short term, and they are less risky for the life. Besides, the presence of 
democracy makes countries to have more enduring and sound institutions 
against economic crises. It is also indicated that democracies affect economic 
growth positively, since democratically governed countries are much likely 
to be constitutional states and they have means to protect the property rights 
(Karakayalı and Yanıkkaya, 2005). 
 Weber argues that modern democracy can occur only in capitalist 
industrialization, since most of the countries which lack an enduring tradition 
of democracy lie in the underdeveloped sections of the world. This argument 
alleges that the wealthiest nations of the world are also the most democratic 
ones, which provides proof of the relationship between economic 
development and democracy (Weber: 2008). Similarly, Lipset also argues 
that, as the nations develop economically, societies develop skills and 
powers that will sustain liberal democratic governance (Lipset, 1959). 
Supporting these arguments, the study conducted by Adam Przeworski and 
Fernando Limongi in 1993 examined the experiences of all countries 
between 1950 and 1990, and found that the regime had a survival chance of 
about 8 years in democratic countries with per capita incomes under $1,500 
USD. In democratic countries with per capita incomes of $1,500-3,000 USD, 
the expected life of the regime increased up to eighteen years. The 
probability that a democracy would die decreased down to 1/500 in countries 
with per capita incomes above $6,000 USD, and the expected life of the 
regime in countries with above $9,000 USD was found to be 736 years. 
Their study showed that 39 countries out of 69 with low levels of economic 
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development failed to sustain democracy (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; 
1997; Zakaria, 2007).  
 The second approach addressing the relationship between economic 
development and democracy argues that democracy is not fundamental for 
ensuring economic development. Among the advocates of this approach is 
Chang (2003), who points out that even if economic development is achieved 
in the industrialized countries, the practices such as suffrage can only be 
realized in formal democracies very late, after lasting struggles. Chang also 
argues that, compared to modern-day industrialized countries in their early 
stages of development, the currently developing countries have much better 
record in terms of spread of formal democracy. In none of the modern-day 
industrialized countries, universal suffrage has been granted below the level 
of $2,000 USD per capita income. However, majority of the currently 
developing countries granted universal suffrage below that level of 
development. From this point of view, Chang suggests that democratization 
is not fundamental for economic development (Chang, 2003). Arguing also 
that democracy cannot be seen as a prerequisite for development, İnsel 
indicates that, in order to make economic development sustainable in a 
society, it is a must to ensure stability in the political data establishing the 
institutional framework which determines the economic activities. Existence 
of political stability in a society causes the entrepreneurs to predict the 
future, thus leading them to longer-term and more permanent economic 
activities, which indicates that political stability is a must for development. 
Thus, the positive nature of the relationship between democracy and 
development does not universally hold true, since democracy is not the only 
system of governance that ensures political stability (İnsel, 1991). Another 
study supporting the arguments of İnsel and Chang is the one conducted by 
Adejumobi. Adejumobi argues that the rate of economic development in a 
country is not necessarily determined by the nature of a political regime. 
According to his argument, what determines the economic development is 
not the nature of political governance, but the nature of the state. If the state 
is developmental, then it is a national state that prioritizes development. It is 
only possible through the construction of a strong bureaucracy for such a 
state to have relative autonomy, i.e. the capacity to manage and implement 
economic policies effectively. In countries with a strong bureaucracy, 
industrialization, and consequently the economic development speeds up 
(Adejumobi, 2000; Boschini 2005: 1).  
 
The relationship between economic development, democracy and 
corruption 
 As specified previously in this study, we think that freedoms 
achieved by economic development are more accessible in democratic 
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systems and they reduce the growth of shadow economy and corruption, thus 
ensuring effective functioning of the institutions. This study aims to reveal 
the relationship between development and democracy using the indices that 
measure the levels of development as well as perceptions of democracy and 
corruption. For this purpose, first, the data collected using the development 
index, democracy index and corruption index will be presented, and then the 
relationship between the data will be scrutinized. 
 The Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the most objective 
and widely used indices used in measuring the level of development and 
comparison of countries. The Human Development Index (HDI) has been 
published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human 
Development Report Office every year since 1990. Based on the values, the 
countries are classified into four groups as follows: low human development 
(0.0 to 0.499), medium human development (0.50 to 0.799), high human 
development (0.80 to 0.90) and very high human development (0.90 to 1.00).         
 The Democracy Index is an index prepared by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries (166 of 
these countries are sovereign states, and 165 are UN member states). The 
index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories 
measuring pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture. The index ranks 
regimes into four as follows: Authoritarian Regime (0 to 4), Hybrid Regime 
(4.01 to 6), Flawed Democracy (6.01 to 8) and Full Democracy (8.01 to 10).   
 Corruption Perceptions Index is an aggregate indicator that ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public officials and politicians. The index score varies between 0 to 
100. High numbers indicate less perception of corruption, whereas lower 
numbers indicate higher perception of corruption.  
 The process of development is crucially affected by various 
interrelated components such as economic and political freedom 
opportunities, transparency and protective security applications. Related to 
this, Table 1 shows the relationship between the development levels of 
countries, the democracy index and corruption. It is striking that countries 
with high levels of development both have improved democratic systems and 
low levels of perceived corruption. In addition to that, corruption index 
decreases with decreasing levels of democracy. When Table 1 is analyzed, a 
strong correlation between these two variables is revealed, strengthening the 
hypothesis that we proposed at the beginning. To put in clearly; the lower the 
democracy levels of countries, the higher the perceived levels of corruption 
in societies.  
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 Table 1. The. Relationship Between Economic Development, Democracy and 
Corruption 
 Democracy Index Corruption Index HDI (Ranking) 
Norway 9.93 86 0.944 (1) 
Sweden 9.73 87 0.898(12) 
Iceland 9.58 79 0.895(13) 
New Zealand 9.26 91 0.910(7) 
Denmark 9.11 92 0.900(10) 
Switzerland 9.09 86 0.917(3) 
Canada 9.08 81 0.902(8) 
Finland 9.03 89 0.879(24) 
Australia 9.01 80 0.933(2) 
Netherlands 8.92 83 0.915(4) 
Luxemburg 8.88 82 0.881(21) 
Ireland 8.72 74 0.899(11) 
Germany 8.64 79 0.911(6) 
Austria 8.54 72 0.881(21) 
United Kingdom 8.31 78 0.892(14) 
United States 8.11 74 0.914 (5) 
Japan 8.08 76 0.890(17) 
Korea 8.06 55 0.891(15) 
Spain 8.05 60 0.869(27) 
France 8.04 69 0.884(20) 
Czech Republic 7.94 51 0.861(28) 
Belgium 7.93 76 0.881(21) 
Italy 7.85 43 0.872(26) 
Chile 7.80 73 0.822(41) 
Portugal 7.79 63 0.822(41) 
Estonia 7.74 69 0.840(33) 
Israel 7.63 60 0.888(19) 
Slovenia 7.57 58 0.874(25) 
Poland 7.47 61 0.834(35) 
Greece 7.45 43 0.853(29) 
Slovak Republic 7.35 50 0.830(37) 
Hungary 6.90 54 0.818(43) 
Mexico 6.68 35 0.756(71) 
Turkey 5.12 45 0.759(69) 
Source: Human Development Report (2014), Democracy Index (2014), Corruption 
Perception Index (2014) 
 
 Theoretically, many studies indicate that liberal democracy provides 
the basis for economic development. The libertarian values such as freedom 
of speech and association, multi-partyism, protection of human rights and 
separation of powers establish the institutional context and process for 
economic development to take place. From this perspective, democracy 
facilitates economic empowerment, provides a stable investment climate and 
speeds up the mobilization of national energies and resources for economic 
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development/growth (Adejumobi, 2000). Studying the relationship between 
democratic systems of governance and long-term economic performance, 
Persson concludes that democratic systems of governance contributes 
significantly but at varying levels to the construction of a social 
infrastructure which encourages long-term economic performance (Persson, 
2004: 4). 
 The Democracy Index rates countries on a 0 to 10 scale, while the 
Development Index rates them on a 0 to 1 scale. Chart 1 clearly shows the 
positive correlation between them.  
Chart 1. The relationship between the Democracy Index and HDI ratings of the OECD 
Countries  
 
 
 Chart 2, which ranks the OECD countries along the x-axis from the 
one with the highest level of democracy (Norway) to the one with the lowest 
level of democracy (Turkey), shows that the level of perceived corruption 
decreases with increasing level of democracy. As specified previously, 
decreased index value indicates increased level of perceived corruption. 
Chart 2. OECD Countries Corruption Index 
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 Effective functioning of regulations, institutions and the judicial 
system in a country is important for achieving success in the process of 
democracy. In that, if a state does not provide services to its citizen through 
transparent, auditable and effectively run institutions, then the citizens may 
prefer conducting their business underground. Citizens do not want to give 
an account of their action to a state which is unable to call them to account 
within the framework of a judicial system. In that case, corruption, 
favoritism, lobbying and underground activities become widespread, starting 
from the level of individual to the level of whole society. As can be seen in 
the chart above, this situation can be represented with the very high 
correlation between democracy and corruption 
 Shadow economy emerges as a natural consequence of high rates of 
corruption in the economies where democracy is weak. In order to make the 
democracy culture widespread and to ensure effective functioning of the 
institutions, government revenues should mostly consist of the tax revenues 
collected on the manufacturing sectors. In return for the tax revenues 
collected from its citizens, the government is obliged to provide them with a 
set of social benefits such as effective services, accountability, good 
governance and right of democratic representation. The fact that taxpayers 
are spread to community at large and the share of taxes they pay in the total 
public revenues is high is an important driving force for making the state 
transparent and accountable (Polat,2010).   
 In Turkey, the large share of shadow economy is one of the major 
problems of the public revenues. Only a small portion of the population pays 
income taxes, making up only 4% of the working age population. Tax 
evasion becomes more obvious when Value Added Tax (VAT) is 
considered. In the year 2005 when the standard VAT rate was 18%, the 
effective VAT rate was 9.6%. The relatively large difference (47%) between 
such high official tax rates and the amount of taxes collected points at an 
important tax evasion problem with VAT. Unreported workers are another 
source of evasion which led to a loss of 1.3% of GDP in 2008 from unpaid 
social security premiums (Goldblatt, Lee, Sahin, Sieber: 2012). Moreover, 
the share of informal sector in GDP is 16% in the developed countries and 
37% in the developing countries. Besides, the share of informal sector in 
labor force is also higher in the underdeveloped or developing countries than 
the developed ones, just like the informal production. The share of informal 
sector in labor force is 25% in the developed countries and 48% in the 
developing countries (IFC, 2013). In this sense, weak democracy and 
corruption appear to be significant barriers to economic development.   
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Table 2. Alternative Measures of Informal Employment and Undeclared Work 
 
Employees in 
informal jobs % 
of non-farm 
employment 
Own account 
workers  
% of non-farm 
employment 
Unpaid family 
workers 
% of non-farm 
employment 
Undeclared 
Income % of 
workforce 
 
Hungary 19.4 6.4 0.3 8.6 
Korea 25.8 17.1 4.7 7.0 
Mexico 31.5 20.6 5.1 30.9 
Turkey 21.7 16.6 3.3 24.6 
Source: OECD (2008) 
 
 Table 2 shows that among the OECD countries with high rates of 
informal economic activities, Turkey ranks after Mexico in terms of informal 
employment. The rates are extremely high when compared to the other 
OECD countries. 
 We can sum up the damage caused by informal economic activities to 
the economy as follows: informal economic activities outside the formal 
sector imply lost tax revenue, limit the ability of the government to provide 
services, undermine the “fiscal social contract” between the state, business, 
and citizen, undermine democracy and the emergence of effective states, and 
limit a country’s capacity to grow. Informal firms are typically smaller and 
less productive compared to small formal firms, large formal firms, and 
formal firms which are generally run by better educated managers who are 
able use opportunities like advertisement and access to finance. The informal 
sector employs a labor force usually of low quality compared to the formal 
sector jobs. Informal jobs tend to be lower in quality, often paying lower 
wages and lacking labor safeguards. Informal workers generally receive no 
overtime compensation or benefits such as health insurance or retirement 
savings. The reason is that informal employers are not bound by labor and 
other standards to protect workers. Formal firms tend to provide safer 
working conditions than informal firms. 
 
Economic development and tax 
 In order for a liberal democracy to continue its existence in a mutual 
relationship of rights and duties based on taxation and representation 
between the government and citizens, a social structure with a wealth 
acquired by production is needed. On the other hand, development of 
modern political institutions, laws and bureaucracies has always been 
impossible in societies having wealth not acquired by production, as easy 
access to money (especially countries with natural resources such as oil and 
mineral resources) means that a government does not need to tax its citizens. 
When a government taxes people it has to provide benefits in return, 
beginning with services, accountability, and good governance but ending 
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with liberty and representation. This reciprocal bargain—between taxation 
and representation—is what gives governments legitimacy in the modern 
world (Zakaria, 2007, p. 74‐78; Polat, 2010: 26).   
 We can take the Middle East countries as an example. When we look 
at the oil rich countries in the Middle East, we can see that wealth not earned 
by production is one of the biggest impediments to economic and political 
modernization. A government that does not have to tax its citizens is unable 
to develop systems such as accountability, transparency and representation. 
Government with a wealth acquired by natural resources does not expect 
anything from its citizens, nor does it provide any service to them in return. 
It is obvious in oil rich countries of the Middle East that economic 
development or enrichment does not necessarily lead to the emergence of a 
liberal democratic system.  
 Therefore, a government’s capacity to effectively execute its 
functions increases when the added value in an economy is registered by 
means of taxation, because effective taxation is a must for a government to 
finance the public services. In their study, Ay and Talaşlı (2008) points out 
how social development is affected by the tax structure (i.e. direct taxes or 
indirect taxes) and economic development. Indirect taxes are those that are 
easy to be shifted. Their payers are unknown. Payment time and amount of 
such taxes cannot be estimated. On the other hand, it is less likely to evade 
these taxes. Value added tax (VAT), special consumption tax (SCT), 
customs duties, banking and insurance transactions tax (BITT) are all among 
the indirect taxes. Direct taxes are those that are not easy to be shifted. 
Payment time and amount of such taxes are previously determined and 
evasion of these taxes is possible. Among these taxes are income and 
corporate taxes, property tax and motor vehicles tax. In general, direct taxes 
are considered to be fairer than the indirect taxes. Whatever the development 
levels of countries are, the tax system cannot be said to be modern and fair in 
countries where indirect taxes occupy much more place in the tax structure. 
Success of a tax system cannot be measured only by high rates of taxes that 
are sufficient to finance public expenditures. Success of a tax system should 
be analyzed taking into consideration its capacity to affect investment and 
savings in the positive direction; whether it has a destructive effect on 
resource allocation in an economy; its corrective effect on income 
distribution, and most importantly, whether it affects economic development 
positively (Ağbal, 2001). Limiting the taxing power of the absolute power 
and creating the legal order for taxation is the first step toward the 
establishment of a constitutional democratic system. An effective tax system 
must help achieving fundamental economic and social objectives such as 
efficiency in resource allocation, fair distribution of income and wealth and 
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economic stability and growth. Thus, a good tax system should first provide 
the resources sufficient to cover the compulsory public expenditures.  
 Table 3 showing the tax distribution in OECD countries reveals that 
Consumption Taxes account for 44.3% of Total Taxation in Turkey, which is 
much higher than the OECD average of 30.7%. Besides, Taxes on Specific 
Goods account for 22% of total taxation which is again much higher than the 
OECD average of 10.5%. 
Table 3. Distribution of Taxes in OECD Countries, 2013 
Countries 
Consumption 
Taxes %Total 
Taxation (2013) 
Taxes on 
Property% 
Total 
Taxation 
(2013) 
Social Security 
Contributions % of 
Total Taxation 
(2013) 
Taxes on Specific 
Goods and 
Services % Total 
Taxation 
(2013) 
Norway 25.9 3.0 23.5 6.9 
Sweden 27.5 2.5 23.3 6.4 
Iceland 31.8 6.9 10.3 9.7 
New Zealand 35.9 6.1 0.0 5.8 
Denmark 29.7 3.9 0.2 9.6 
Switzerland 19.5 6.7 25.1 6.4 
Canada 22.5 10.4 15.8 8.3 
Finland 32.1 2.9 28.9 10.8 
Australia 23.8 9.4 0.0 10.8 
Netherlands 26.4 3.4 40.8 8.6 
Luxemburg 28 7.3 28.8 8.7 
Ireland 30.6 7.1 17.8 10.2 
Germany 26.9 2.5 38.1 7.8 
Austria 25.8 1.7 34.3 7.6 
United Kingdom 31.7 12.3 18.8 10.7 
United States 14.6 11.3 24.2 6.8 
Japan 15.9 8.8 40.9 6.7 
Korea 28.8 10.3 26.4 11.8 
Spain 26.4 6.7 34.5 8.6 
France 23.4 8.4 37.2 7.7 
Czech Republic 32.5 1.4 43.2 10.7 
Belgium 22.8 7.8 31.7 7.2 
Italy 23 6.2 29.8 9.7 
Chile 50.7 4.1 7.2 9.9 
Portugal 35.2 3.3 25.9 11.7 
Estonia 39.9 1.0 34.8 13.8 
Israel 36.3 8.8 16.6 5.9 
Slovenia 37.5 1.7 40.1 14.6 
Poland 35.1 4.4 38.6 13.1 
Greece 34.7 7.6 31.1 12.7 
Slovak Republic 31.6 1.5 43.8 10.6 
Hungary 42.9 3.4 32.6 13.1 
Mexico 49.2 1.5 15.5 31.6 
Turkey 44.3 4.6 27.4 22.4 
OECD unweighted 
average 30.7 5.6 26.1 10.5 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2014 
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 Both Table 3 and Table 4 show that the high share of indirect taxes in 
the tax revenues is one of the biggest problems that negatively affect the fair 
distribution of income in Turkey. Because, tax revenues that could not be 
directly collected from income and activities as well as the taxes levied on 
consumption without distinction of the rich and poor show that there is no 
transparent interaction between the government and taxpayers, and the share 
of informal activities in the economy is high. 
Table 4 Indirect Tax and Informal Economic Activities Paradox. 
Countries Direct Tax (%) Indirect Tax (%) Informal Activities (%) 
United States 76.3 23.7 8.6 
Germany 50.7 48.9 16.8 
Austria 55.2 44.1 13.8 
Belgium 62.2 36.1 21.5 
Denmark 65.6 34.2 17.5 
France 53.7 46 14.8 
Holland 50.3 48.5 12.8 
England 60 39.4 12.3 
Spain 55.2 44.2 22.3 
Sweden 61.6 38 18.7 
Switzerland 69.6 30.4 9.5 
Canada 68.4 31.6 15.4 
Norway 59.4 40.6 18.7 
Turkey 34.4 65.6 30-60 
Source: Ay,H.M., Talaşlı,,E. Ülkelerin Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Seviyeleri ve Vergi Yapıları 
Arasındaki İlişki [The Relationship between Economic Development Levels of Countries 
and Tax Structures], Maliye Dergisi, Volume 154, 2008 
 
 Although the gross national income per capita increases in some 
countries, their  neither human development level nor democratic freedoms 
increase as much as the other countries with similar index values in the West. 
The most important reason for such countries to fall behind in terms of 
human development and democratic freedoms despite the increasing 
economic growth is the unfair distribution of income. The government 
comes into play in cases of income equality, and by means of collecting 
taxes, takes some steps that will support the low income groups. Trying to 
achieve the welfare equality among different social classes to a certain extent 
by means of social transfer expenditures. The government resorts to 
increasing taxes to carry out this mission. Unable to finance the public 
expenditures through taxes collected from registered economic activities, the 
government tries to increase its revenues through indirect taxes. The 
correlation between the indirect taxes and informal economic activities 
shown in Table 4 confirms this relationship. However, as specified 
previously, informal production is inefficient for the economy, as it cannot 
be controlled. Since many companies that cannot be engaged in any 
European Scientific Journal July 2016 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
14 
production activities if they effectively pay their taxes still run their business 
underground, they can produce products with low costs, but force other 
uncorrupt companies to unfair competition. This causes a problems called 
“moral hazard” in the literature.  
 As analyzed by Işık (2009) in detail, there is a significant correlation 
between the democracy culture and tax moral. The studies show that direct 
democracy has a significant impact on tax moral in Sweden. It was detected 
that democracy and attitudes of the taxpayers have a positive impact on tax 
moral not only in Sweden, but also in Belgium and Spain. Constitutional 
confidence (confidence in legal system) and the existing political-economic 
confidence are important for a society that pays its taxes. Therefore, for the 
governments and tax administrations, running a strategy aiming to build 
confidence in themselves and their competencies may result in higher tax 
moral (Nerre, 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
 Establishment of a regular tax system that can finance the public 
services is one of the conditions required for a democratic regime to function 
properly (Çağan, 1980). Taxation is of critical importance not only for 
economic relations of production to be grounded in a sound and legal 
framework, but also for the functionality of the democratic political system. 
Nowadays, most of the developed Western democracies are derived from the 
relationship between taxation and representation. An individual paying 
his/her taxes to the government develops an ability to question the quality of 
public services provided to him/her in return. In the Western type 
parliamentary democracies, this led to the emergence of state-citizen 
relationship based on the mutual rights and responsibilities of the state and 
citizens. Individuals should be able to foresee the government interventions 
to the rights and freedoms through taxation, and should make their future 
plans accordingly. In this way, arbitrary taxation can be prevented to a 
considerable extent. Therefore, a sound taxation system also indicates a 
sound legal order in that country. Constitutional state is a must for effective 
taxation. Lack the confidence in the state and legal order increases corruption 
and informal activities. Increase in the informal activities affects the total tax 
revenue to be collected by the government negatively, thus causing the 
government either to be involved in making investment through borrowing, 
or not to be involved in investments at all. The high share of informal 
economic activities in the total production also affects the ability to run 
effective and productive business activities adversely. The manufacturers 
reluctant to pay their taxes to the government prefer manufacturing with low 
labor costs, as they are not subject to any governmental supervision. This 
prevents the welfare and wealth from extending to the poorer parts of the 
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society, i.e. the fair distribution of income. Poor quality products produced 
with low costs and unskilled labor must be cheap, which creates a cycle of 
low-cost production. Entering into competition with low-priced products at 
the international markets is one of the biggest impediments to the economic 
growth of a country. 
 For a political system with democratic freedoms, it is important to 
consider how economic development is distributed among the individuals. If 
economic development is achieved through effective taxation on production, 
then the size of the shadow economy will be reduced, leading to a fairer 
distribution of income. Integration of taxation into a system that takes into 
account the income distribution is closely related with the principle of a 
constitutional state and can only be achieved with a strong legal 
arrangement. Countries with a strong legal structure have low level of 
perceived corruption, just like the low size of shadow economy. In countries 
where income distribution is relatively fair and taxes are imposed on income, 
the citizens have confidence in the government for the economic and 
political matters, which leads to increased tax moral and awareness of 
citizenship. In countries where such an environment is created, the relations 
between the citizens and the government are based on mutual rights and 
duties. Therefore, the representation system which is the most widely used 
mechanism for the functioning of democratic regimes is mainly based on the 
rights and duties. 
 We conclude that the relationship between democracy and 
development is defined by the nature of the instruments that bring forth 
economic development. In this respect, existence and continuity of a 
democratic regime depends on economic development; however, the 
development must be based on effective taxation and a strong legal order 
required by such a tax structure.  
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